Guest Author: M. Pilar Honer, Esq., Columbus, Ohio
In New Millennium Trading, L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 18, the Tax Court, consistent with prior case law, held that treasury regulation § 301.6221-1T(c) and (d) (the “Regulation”) prevented 70% partner AJF-1 from raising a partner-level defense in the partnership level proceeding. The court also for the first time addressed the issue as to whether the Regulation was valid, and in using the Chevron standard, held that it was. The Regulation provides that a partner-level defense may not be raised during a partnership-level proceeding. This Regulation stems from TEFRA, which was enacted by Congress to eliminate the administrative burdens of duplicative audits, duplicative litigations, and inconsistent tax treatments when dealing with partnerships items. TEFRA provides that all partnership items are determined in a single partnership-level proceeding. These determinations, including the imposition of penalties, are then binding on all partners and may not be challenged in a subsequent partner-level proceeding. Further, at the partnership-level proceeding, the court may only consider the partnership’s defenses rather than the individual partner’s defenses.
In the present case, partner AJF-1, wanted to raise its own partner-level defenses to the FPAA determination, which held that I.R.C. § 6662 penalties applied to partnership New Millenium Trading, LLC (“New Millenium”). The Regulation, however, did not allow AJF-1 to raise its own personal defenses until a later refund action. AJF-1, therefore, raised two arguments to prevent the application of the Regulation. First, that the Regulation was invalid because it was promulgated without authority and conflicted with Congress’ statutory scheme. Second and in the alternative, that even if the Regulation is valid, it was not applicable to the present case.
First, as to the validity of the Regulation, the court followed the Chevron standard of analysis and upheld the Regulation as being a valid interpretation of the statute. Under the Chevron standard of analysis, the court first asks whether Congress has already spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If Congress’ intent has been clearly spoken, then both the court and the agency must give effect to Congress’ expressed intent. If, however, Congress has not directly addressed the question at issue, then the court must determine whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
As to the first part of the Regulation, that a partner-level defense may only be raised in a subsequent refund action, the court held that Congress had already spoken directly on point. The court found that Congress’ intent was clearly expressed when reading I.R.C. §§ 6221, 6223(c)(1), and 6230(c)(4). Therefore, that part of the Regulation was upheld. As to the Regulation’s definition as to what constitutes a partner-level defense, the court held was a permissible interpretation of the statute. The Regulation defines a partner-level defense as those that are “personal to the partner or are dependent upon the partner’s separate return.” The court found that this definition did not limit the partner’s defenses but rather just confirmed that they are one’s that are personal to the partner.
Since the Regulation was upheld as being valid, AJF-1 presented an alternative argument that since it was a 70% partner, its defenses should be considered. Its reasoning was that since partner-level conduct led to the imposition of the penalties, partner-level defenses should be considered at the partnership-level proceeding. In support of its argument, AJF-1 relied on an IRS issue paper. This issue paper stated that “to the extent that the taxpayer effectively acted as the general partner and that the intent of the general partner is determined at the partnership level, it is likely that such partnership level determinations may also dispose of partner-level defenses under the unique facts of each case.” The court as not persuaded by this issue paper because although AJF-1 was a 70% partner, it was not a general partner. AJF-1 also cited two cases, Santa Monica Pictures, L.L.C v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-104, and Long Term Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, both where the courts considered the defenses of a managing partner. Again, here the court raised the distinguishing fact that AJF-1 was not a managing partner and was not persuaded by these cases as well. Therefore, the court held that AJF-1 could not raise its own individual defenses at the partner-level proceeding but would have to wait until a later refund action.